A theory of institutional change is essential for further progress in the social sciences in general and economics in particular. Essential because neo-classical theory (and other theories in the social scientist's toolbag) at present cannot satisfactorily account for the very diverse performance of societies and economies both at a moment of time and over time. The explanations derived from neo-classical theory are not satisfactory because, while the models may account for most of the differences in performance between economies on the basis of differential investment in education, savings rates, etc., they do not account for why economies would fail to undertake the appropriate activities if they had a high payoff.
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Institutions determine the payoffs. While the fundamental neo-classical assumption of scarcity and hence competition has been robust (and is basic to this analysis), the assumption of a frictionless exchange process has led economic theory astray. Institutions are the structure that humans impose on human interaction and therefore define the incentives that (together with the other constraints (budget, technology, etc.) determine the choices that 2 individuals make that shape the performance of societies and economies over time.
In the following pages, I sketch out a framework for analyzing institutions. This framework builds on the economic theory of choice subject to constraints. However it incorporates new assumptions about both the constraints that individuals face and the process by which they make choices within those constraints. Among the traditional neoclassical assumptions that are relaxed are those of costless exchange, perfect information, and unlimited cognitive capabilities. Too many gaps still remain in our understanding of this new approach to call it a theory.
What I do provide are a set of definitions, principles, and a structure which provide much of the scaffolding necessary to develop a theory of institutional change.
Institutions and Organizations: Definitions and Descriptions
Institutions consist of formal rules, informal constraints (norms of behavior, conventions, and self imposed codes of conduct) and the enforcement characteristics of both. The degree to which there is an identity between the objectives of the institutional constraints and the choices individuals make in that institutional setting depends on the effectiveness of enforcement. Enforcement is carried out by the first party (self imposed codes of conduct), by the second party (retaliation), and/or by a third party (societal sanctions or coercive enforcement by the state). Institutions affect 3 economic performance by determining (together with the technology employed) transaction and transformation (production) costs.
If institutions are the rules of the game, organizations are the players. They are groups of individuals engaged in purposive activity. The constraints imposed by the institutional framework (together with the other constraints) define the opportunity set and therefore the kind of organizations that will come into existence.
Given its objective function--profit maximization, winning elections, regulating businesses, educating students--the organization which may be a firm, a political party, a regulatory agency, a school or college, will engage in acquiring skills and knowledge that will enhance its survival possibilities in the context of ubiquitous scarcity and hence competition. The kinds of skills and knowledge that will pay off will be a function of the incentive structure inherent in the institutional matrix. If the highest rates of return in a society are to be made from piracy, then organizations will invest in knowledge and skills that will make them better pirates; if organizations realize the highest payoffs by increasing productivity then they will invest in skills and knowledge to achieve that objective. Organizations may not only directly invest in acquiring skills and knowledge but indirectly (via the political process) induce public investment in those kinds 4 of knowledge that they believe will enhance their survival prospects.
The new (or neo) institutional economics has produced a substantial literature dealing with institutions and organizations. The property rights literature (Alchian,1965 , Demsetz, 1967 , for example, analyzes the implications of institutions and organizations for performance, but in most of it the formation and evolution of institutions and organizations remain exogenous to the analysis. Oliver Williamson (1975 Williamson ( , 1985 and the many other court decisions that were gradually altering the legal framework depended on the degree to which the information feedback on the consequences of existing laws were accurate and hence gave true models. True or false, the models the judiciary acted upon were incrementally altering the judicial framework.
As with all institutional frameworks, the rules were a mixed bag of those that promoted increased productivity and those that encouraged monopoly, income redistribution and inefficient resource allocation; but the former have overwhelmingly dominated the institutional framework and produced a path dependent pattern of economic growth that has persisted for more than three centuries. To illustrate this path dependent process I turn from this overarching story to a more detailed examination of one facet of this story--land policy--that will put more meat on the analytical bones of this framework.
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